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A B S T R A C T
In a constantly changing environment we must adapt to both abrupt and gradual changes to incoming in-
formation. Previously, we demonstrated that a distributed network (including the anterior insula and anterior
cingulate cortex) was active when participants updated their initial representations (e.g., it's a cat) in a gradually
morphing picture task (e.g., now it's a rabbit; Stöttinger et al., 2015). To shed light on whether these activations
reﬂect the proactive decisions to update or perceptual uncertainty, we introduced two additional conditions. By
presenting picture morphs twice we controlled for uncertainty in perceptual decision making. Inducing an
abrupt shift in a third condition allowed us to diﬀerentiate between a proactive decision in uncertainty-driven
updating and a reactive decision in surprise-based updating. We replicated our earlier result, showing the ro-
bustness of the eﬀect. In addition, we found activation in the anterior insula (bilaterally) and the mid frontal
area/ACC in all three conditions, indicative of the importance of these areas in updating of all kinds. When
participants were naïve as to the identity of the second object, we found higher activations in the mid-cingulate
cortex and cuneus – areas typically associated with task diﬃculty, in addition to higher activations in the right
TPJ most likely reﬂecting the shift to a new perspective. Activations associated with the proactive decision to
update to a new interpretation were found in a network including the dorsal ACC known to be involved in
exploration and the endogenous decision to switch to a new interpretation. These ﬁndings suggest a general
network commonly engaged in all types of perceptual decision making supported by additional networks as-
sociated with perceptual uncertainty or updating provoked by either proactive or reactive decision making.
1. Introduction
Every day we are confronted with an enormous amount of in-
formation. Mental models compress incoming sensory information into
a tractable form to optimally guide decision making (Johnson-Laird,
2004; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). We rely on such representations for a
wide range of decisions. However, the world is in constant ﬂux. In order
for our mental models to be useful we must be capable of revising them
in the face of environmental changes. While sometimes the decision to
update to a new interpretation (e.g., Is this food edible or not?) is ac-
companied by a certain degree of uncertainty (e.g., When is my steak
grilled to perfection?). At other times this decision is made for us and
we only have to react to the changes in the environment (e.g., the steak
falls from the barbecue; McGuire et al., 2014).
We previously demonstrated that a distributed network including
the anterior insula, dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, and inferior parietal
lobes was activated when participants updated their representations to
the gradual accumulation of changing information (Stöttinger et al.,
2015). Participants viewed picture sets in which one unique object
(e.g., a shark) morphed slowly over ﬁfteen iterations into a completely
diﬀerent unique object (e.g., a plane). Participants pressed diﬀerent
buttons to indicate whether they saw the ﬁrst or another object. The
average amount of change (in pixels) between each transition was held
constant at∼ 4% with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the individual
picture positions (Stöttinger et al., 2016). Consequently, the transition
from an old to a new model was internally determined by the individual
as opposed to being driven by external events. The highest activations
were found in the anterior insula (bilaterally) and mid frontal area
including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). These areas were not
only active at the time point of change but also immediately before,
suggesting a possible causal role of these areas in updating. This ﬁnding
was consistent with earlier results in patients showing that damage to
the anterior insula – especially on the right – resulted in selective up-
dating impairments in both the picture morphing task and in playing a
simple competitive game (Danckert et al., 2012; Stöttinger et al., 2014;
under revision), indicating a general updating impairment across
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diﬀerent cognitive domains.
The results could be explained in three ways. First, activations may
reﬂect proactive decisions to update, based on imprecision of the initial
belief (McGuire et al., 2014): Given that diﬀerences between pictures
were held constant with no abrupt deviations, it was up to the parti-
cipant to decide at which point their initial representation was no
longer supported by the evidence from the environment. This is similar
to bistable perception where participants report which of two inter-
pretations of an object they hold, despite no environmental change in
the stimulus. The anterior insula is active when participants switch
between interpretations of such stimuli (Lumer and Rees, 1999; Knapen
et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2005; Weilnhammer et al., 2017). Despite the
diﬀerence between spontaneous alternations in bistable perception and
updating based on actual, albeit subtle, changes – a similar mechanism
may be involved. In both cases the transition from the old to the new
interpretation is determined internally by the participant rather than
being determined by events in the environment. A second way to ex-
plain our prior results is via perceptual uncertainty: While all picture sets
were based on the prerequisite that they were perceived categorically in
our normative study (Stöttinger et al., 2016), we cannot fully rule out
that decisions were accompanied by a certain degree of perceptual
uncertainty. This would ﬁt with research showing that a network in-
cluding the anterior insula is engaged when belief updating is based on
relative uncertainty in a gradually changing, noisy, uncertain, or per-
ceptually degraded environment (Ploran et al., 2007; Heekeren et al.,
2008 for review). Similarly, activation in the insula is modulated by the
ambiguity of sensory information (Lamichhane et al., 2016; Sterzer and
Kleinschmidt, 2010 for a review). A third potential explanation of our
results would suggest that activations reﬂected a more general network
always active whenever we update mental representations. This is in
line with research on surprise-based updating which assigns a central
role to the anterior insula and ACC. When observations in our en-
vironment saliently deviate from expectations, the right anterior insula
initiates attentional control by activating the central executive network
and deactivating the default mode network. As a consequence, cogni-
tive resources are assigned to facilitate processing of the surprising,
salient stimulus. The co-activation with the ACC allows rapid access to
the motor system (Craig, 2009; Menon and Uddin, 2010; Uddin, 2015
for a review). The network found in our study might therefore be best
understood more generally as a network for updating mental re-
presentations, signaled either by bottom-up salience, or internal signals.
The aim of this research was to evaluate each of these three ex-
planations. That is, which brain areas are active regardless of the me-
chanism involved (proactive decision vs. perceptual uncertainty) and
which brain areas are speciﬁc to each process. We presented partici-
pants with three diﬀerent conditions: (1) gradual-naïve condition: In 10
separate sets pictures morphed gradually from one object to a second –
replicating our initial study (Stöttinger et al., 2015). (2) A gradual-repeat
condition: where all gradually morphing sets were presented twice thus
diminishing perceptual uncertainty. For both series continuous changes
result in the proactive decision to update a perceptual model due to the
gradual accumulation of evidence. In the gradual-naïve condition the
decision is accompanied by a greater degree of uncertainty, given the
participant does not know what the second object will be. This un-
certainty is reduced when the participant is exposed to this same set a
second time (the gradual-repeat condition). As a further control for
neural systems responding reactively to change we added an (3) abrupt
condition where after a certain number of subtly changing pictures (akin
to the gradual-naïve condition) updating was provoked by a dramatic
change in the external input by switching to a new picture that was not
coherent with the current pictorial set. Participants in the abrupt con-
dition simply had to react to the abrupt change in visual input while
updating in the gradual-naïve condition required them to proactively
decide at which point their initial model was no longer supported by the
evidence.
We ﬁrst replicated our previous results. We then evaluated which
activations were associated with a switch in general, irrespective of an
active decision to update to a new model or perceptual uncertainty.
Finally, by comparing brain activation associated with a shift in con-
scious percept in the gradual-naïve condition with activations for the
same shift in the abrupt condition we identiﬁed areas selectively as-
sociated with proactive decisions. In a similar vein, comparing per-
ceptual shifts in the gradual-naïve condition with shifts in the gradual
repeat condition allowed us to evaluate the inﬂuence of perceptual
uncertainty.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of twenty (11 female) neurologically healthy participants
with normal or corrected to normal vision took part in this study for
payment. Due to a technical problem, data of one participant could not
be analyzed. The ﬁnal sample comprised nineteen participants (10 fe-
male; mean age 24.55 years, SD=4.02). One participant reported being
left-hand dominant. The individual activation pattern of this participant
did not deviate from the activation pattern of the right-hand-dominant
group. Given that left-handed people represent a portion of the popu-
lation we decided to include this participant in the sample (see Willems
et al., 2014 for that argument). None of the participants had a history of
brain injury. All participants provided informed consent prior to par-
ticipation. The research protocol was approved by the Oﬃce of Re-
search Ethics at the University of Waterloo and the Tri-Hospital Re-
search Ethics Board of the Region of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada.
2.2. The picture morphing task
2.2.1. Stimuli
Each participant saw thirty picture sets selected from a larger set
validated in an earlier study (Stöttinger et al., 2016; https://osf.io/
qi2vg/). All pictures were silhouettes of line drawings and of a standard
size (316×316 pixels) – displayed on a white background (Fig. 1). All
participants saw three diﬀerent types of picture sets: (1) Gradual-naïve
condition: In ten picture sets line drawings of common objects morphed
over ﬁfteen iterations into a diﬀerent object (a replication of Stöttinger
et al., 2015). (2) Gradual-Repeat condition: all gradually morphing sets
were presented a second time. (3) Abrupt condition: In ten picture sets a
salient switch was induced after the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, or 8th position
(there were two sets for each switch position and switch position was
randomly assigned across the six runs with the constraint that the same
switch position did not occur within the same run). This switch violated
the continuous changes used in the ﬁrst two conditions in that the
change was to an image from an unrelated set (Fig. 1, bottom line).
Please note that picture sets used in the abrupt condition were diﬀerent
from the sets used in the continuous conditions. In order to keep the
abrupt condition as similar as possible to the gradual-naïve condition,
the ﬁrst three pictures of a set were repeated. This resulted in subtle
changes between pictures – similar to the ones in the gradual-naïve
condition. Data from a pilot study suggested that participants typically
do not notice this level of repetition: No participant reported noticing
the repetition and reaction times reliably ramped up before the switch
in all conditions. This suggests that participants were actively looking
for the second object given that they did not know whether they were in
the gradual-naïve or abrupt condition. Repeating the ﬁrst three pictures
in the abrupt condition had the advantage that picture sets were com-
parable in both conditions while guaranteeing that participants did not
shift to a new interpretation before the intended change point.
Of the sixty pictures used, thirty-one depicted an animate object
(e.g., animal) and twenty-nine displayed an inanimate object. In ten
sets the object morphed from an animate object into a diﬀerent animate
object (e.g., cat – owl), in nine cases the object morphed within the
inanimacy class (e.g., key – saw). In six picture sets the object morphed
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from an animate into an inanimate object (e.g., shark – plane) and in
ﬁve cases the order was reversed, morphing from an inanimate to an
animate object (e.g., tree – face). About the same number of between
and within category switches were used in the gradual (6 within, 4
between) and abrupt conditions (7 within, 3 between).
2.2.2. Behavioral paradigm
The picture morphing task consisted of thirty picture sets dis-
tributed over six experimental runs. Each run included ﬁve picture sets,
containing either two gradual-naïve, two gradual-repeat and one abrupt
picture set or one gradual-naïve, one gradual-repeat and three abrupt
picture sets. The gradual-naïve and gradual-repeat versions of one
picture set were always within the same run. The order of picture sets
per run was randomized with the constraint that the same picture set
(i.e., gradual-naïve and gradual-repeat) was never repeated back to
back. This randomized order was consistent across participants. Runs
were counterbalanced between participants using a Latin square.
Picture morphing in each picture set occurred over ﬁfteen discrete
steps, each corresponding with the acquisition of a whole-brain image.
Each picture within a set was presented for two seconds. Pictures were
randomly intermixed with eight inter-stimulus-interval periods (2, 4, 6
or 8 s) during which participants saw a ﬁxation cross. The full pre-
sentation of one picture set took 110 s. The total duration to present all
sets was 55min. Together with the anatomical scan (about 10min) and
short breaks in between the six runs, participants spent about 70min in
the scanner. Participants provided their responses in the scanner using
two buttons on a four button Cedrus ﬁbre optic system. Participants
were asked to press a button for each picture – the ﬁrst button (pressed
with the index ﬁnger) when they ‘saw the ﬁrst object’ then changing to
the second button (pressed with middle ﬁnger) when they ‘saw the
second object’. Except for the repeat condition, all participants were
naïve as to the identity of the second object. Although speed was not
emphasized, participants were encouraged to make a button press
within the 2-second time window during which the picture was pre-
sented on the screen. On a few occasions (i.e., in .56% of individual
presentations of an image) participants failed to do so. Instead they
made a button press in the inter stimulus interval (ISI) following the
picture. Reaction times for ISI button presses were added to the pre-
sentation time of the preceding image, resulting in an RT greater than
2000ms.
At the end of each set of 15 images the word “END” was presented
for 2 s to indicate that the next picture set would begin shortly.
Infrequently, a participant failed to press any button (i.e., in .63% of
individual presentations of an image). Most of the time omissions were
preceded and followed by the same button press, suggesting no change
in the participant's conscious percept. In six individual cases the
omission occurred between a switch in button presses. In those cases
the moment of change was assigned to the ﬁrst occasion when the
second button was pressed. One participant never reported the second
object in one set – both sets (gradual-naïve and gradual-repeat) were
removed from further analysis. Another participant alternated between
button 1 and button 2 in one set (both sets – gradual-naïve and gradual-
repeat – were removed from further analysis).
To familiarize participants with the procedure and timing of the
task, each participant took part in a training session a few days prior to
scanning. Participants were trained with ﬁve diﬀerent picture sets,
none of which was used in the actual scanning period. Instructions were
repeated before the start of the actual experiment.
2.3. fMRI data collection
Functional data were acquired using gradient echo-planar T2*-
weighted images collected on a 1.5 T Phillips scanner located at Grand
River Hospital in Waterloo, Ontario (TR = 2000ms; TE = 40ms; slice
thickness = 5mm with no gap; 26 slices/volume; FOV = 220×
220mm2; voxel size = 2.75× 2.75× 5mm3; ﬂip angle = 90°). Each
experimental run consisted of 285 volumes preceded by four dummy
scans to allow transient signals to diminish. At the beginning of each
session, a whole brain T1-weighted anatomical image was collected for
each participant (TR = 7.4ms; TE = 3.4ms; voxel size = 1× 1×
1mm3; FOV = 240× 240mm2; 150 slices with no gap; ﬂip angle =
8°). The experimental protocol was programmed using E-Prime ex-
perimental presentation software (v1.1 SP3; Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Stimuli were presented on an Avotec Silent
Vision™ ﬁbre-optic presentation system using binocular projection
glasses (Model SV-7021). The onset of each trial was synchronized with
the onset of data collection for the appropriate functional volume using
trigger pulses from the scanner.
2.4. fMRI data analysis
Functional data were analyzed using SPM12 (Wellcome Department
of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; Friston et al., 1997). Pre-
processing included slice-time and motion correction. High-resolution
T1-weighted structural images were co-registered with each subject's
EPI images, and normalized to the MNI template brain (Montreal
Neurological Institute, McGill, Montreal, Canada). The normalized
images were resampled to isotropic 3×3×3mm voxels and smoothed
with a 6mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
After images were smoothed, physiological noise was removed using a
Functional Image Artefact Correction Heuristic (FIACH) as im-
plemented by Tierney et al. (2016). The functional data were high-pass
ﬁltered to remove frequencies below 1/128 Hz to reduce low frequency
drift. The serial correlation was taken into account using the auto-
correlation AR(1) model.
We used a 2×3 ﬂexible factorial design as implemented in SPM12
with the within subjects factors of Condition (gradual-naïve, gradual-
repeat, abrupt) and Change (i.e., the change picture vs. stable pictures;
stable pictures were the three pictures at the start and end of each set
for which participants did not report a change). This analysis was
Fig. 1. Examples of three diﬀerent picture sets used in the gradual (naïve and repeat) and abrupt conditions. For fMRI analysis the three pictures at the beginning and end (light blue
boxes) were compared with the change period (the moment of change (dark orange) plus the picture preceding and following the change picture; light orange). (For interpretation of the
references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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calculated separately for three diﬀerent time points – the change image
(T0) when button presses changed from button 1 to button 2, as well as
the picture preceding (− T1) and following the change (T1). Activation
at T1 was analyzed for comparison purposes with our original study
(Stöttinger et al., 2015).
To evaluate whether results replicated data of our previous study
(Stöttinger et al., 2015) we ﬁrst calculated this analysis for gradual-
naïve picture sets only. Whole-brain, random-eﬀects group analysis was
conducted with contrast t maps thresholded at a family-wise-error
(FWE) of = .05. Only clusters of 10 contiguous voxels or more are re-
ported.
To identify areas jointly active in all three conditions we used a
three-way conjunction null analysis for all three contrasts (1) gradual-
naïve-change> gradual-naïve stable, (2) gradual-repeat-change>
gradual-repeat-stable, (3) abrupt-change> abrupt-stable) of whole-
brain eﬀects. Finally, to explore selective eﬀects in each of the three
conditions we compared the change pictures between conditions. For
that we applied diﬀerent contrast weights at the corresponding re-
gressors (Gläscher and Gitelman, 2008). Again, analyses were done
separately for each of the three time points (− T1, T0, T1). An un-
corrected threshold of p < .001 was used for both types of analyses
(conjunction and selective contrasts), corrected for FWE-extended
cluster threshold.
2.5. Statistical analysis of behavioral data
Data was analyzed using repeated measures ANOVAs. Statistical
tests were two-tailed and an alpha-level of p < .05 was used to de-
termine signiﬁcance. To evaluate the inﬂuence of condition on response
pattern the average amount of ﬁrst object reports were entered into a
repeated measures analysis with condition (gradual-naïve vs. gradual-
repeat) as the within subjects factor. A mixed design repeated measures
analysis with the between subjects factor of experiment (normative
study vs. current study) and the within subjects factor of picture
number (1–15) was used to determine whether response patterns (i.e.,
proportions of ﬁrst object reports) in the fMRI study replicated beha-
vioral data from our normative study (Stöttinger et al., 2016).
A similar analysis was done for reaction times with averaged RT
entered into a repeated measures analysis with time point (− T6 to T6)
and condition (gradual-naïve, gradual-repeat, abrupt) as within sub-
jects factors. In a second step, the same analysis was calculated re-
stricted to time points relevant to the change-point indication (− T2,−
T1, T0; where T0 indicates the change report). For post-hoc analyses
(e.g., comparison at T0 between gradual-naïve and gradual-repeat) a
repeated measures analysis was used restricted to the two conditions of
interest.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
Participants reported perceiving the second object between the
fourth and fourteenth pictures with the majority of reports (88.03%)
between the ﬁfth and tenth picture. Participants on average reported
the second object around the 8th picture. Participants reported the
second object slightly later in the gradual-naïve condition (Mean =
8.50 picture, SE = .23) compared to the gradual-repeat condition
(Mean = 8.07 picture, SE = .21; F(1,18) = 7.52, p < .05, η2 = .30;
Fig. 2a). Response patterns in the gradual-naïve condition replicated
normative data in our earlier study (Stöttinger et al., 2016). We found
neither a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for experiment [F(1,18) = .45,
p > .50, η2 = .02], nor a signiﬁcant interaction between image
number and experiment [F(14,252) = .78, p > .45, η2 = .04]. Hence,
the diﬀerence in reporting method (verbal vs. forced choice button
press) did not inﬂuence response patterns in the current study.
Reaction times averaged across all 13 time points (-T6 to T6) were
highest in the gradual-naïve condition (Mean = 778ms, SE = 34ms)
and lowest in the abrupt condition (Mean = 656ms, SE = 28ms) [F
(2,36) = 87.73, p < .001, η2 = .83] as demonstrated by a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect for condition. At the time point of change (T0) reaction
times were signiﬁcantly higher in the gradual-naïve (Mean = 1133ms,
SE = 61ms) compared to the gradual-repeat (Mean = 1005ms, SE =
60ms; F(1,18) = 6.08, p < .05, η2 = .25) and abrupt conditions (Mean
= 836ms, SE = 30ms; F(1,18) = 45.05, p < .001, η2 = .72).
Reaction times in all three conditions started to ramp up before parti-
cipants reported a change (T0; Fig. 1c). A repeated measures analysis
with the within subject factors of image relevant to change indication
(− T2,− T1, T0; where T0 indicates the change image) and condition
(gradual-naïve, gradual-repeat, abrupt) revealed a signiﬁcant main ef-
fect for condition [F(2,36) = 70.36, p < .001, η2 = .80] and time [F
(2,36) = 23.03, p < .001, η2 = .56] but no signiﬁcant interaction
between time x condition [F(4,72) = .41, p > .80, η2 = .02]. Reaction
times in all three conditions reliably ramped up between − T2 and T0
[gradual-naïve: F(2,36) = 13.57, p < .01, η2 = .43; gradual-repeat: F
(2,36) = 6.68, p < .01, η2 = .27; abrupt: F(2,36) = 14.71, p < .01, η2
= .45], suggesting that participants in all three conditions were ac-
tively exploring alternate interpretations of the stimuli (Fig. 2b).
3.2. Imaging results
3.2.1. Activation in the gradual-naïve condition: replicating prior results
Immediately before participants reported a shift in their conscious
percept (–T1) activations within a network including the anterior insula
(bilateral) and mid frontal area were observed. At the time point when
perceptual reports changed (T0), higher activations were observed in a
network of brain regions including the anterior insula, dorsal medial
frontal cortex (including the ACC), inferior frontal, and inferior parietal
cortex. After a change was reported no area showed higher activation
for the change picture compared to the stable pictures (Table 1; Fig. 3).
These results closely resemble our initial results (Stöttinger et al., 2015)
also demonstrating activations in the anterior insula (bilaterally) and
mid-frontal regions (including the ACC), immediately before (∼ 5 s)
and at the moment of change, but not after. In addition, the lack of any
activation after the switch (T1) reliably shows that the pattern of ac-
tivations found in both studies cannot simply be explained by the 4%
change in pixels between pictures.
3.3. Areas commonly involved in all three conditions
At the picture immediately preceding the switch (− T1) a con-
junction analysis revealed joint overlap in all three condition in the
right inferior frontal gyrus (MNI 48 8 22) only. The same conjunction
analysis calculated for the time point of switch (T0) revealed joint ac-
tivation in a distributed network, including the anterior insula, inferior
frontal and inferior parietal regions. The strongest activations were
found in the anterior insula (bilaterally; Fig. 4 and Table 2). At the
picture immediately following the switch (T1) joint activations in all
three conditions were found in the right angular gyrus/superior parietal
lobe (MNI 42-58 49).
3.4. Selective involvement – perceptual uncertainty vs. proactive decision to
update2
3.4.1. Perceptual uncertainty: gradual-naïve vs. gradual-repeat
Higher activations for gradual-repeat compared to gradual-naïve
were found in the left angular gyrus (MNI− 36−55 46; BA 39) at the
2 Diﬀerences in activation between conditions were typically a consequence of higher
activation for the change image (− T1, T0, or T1) compared to the stable images in a
given condition. For the comparison gradual-naïve> gradual-repeat at T0 only, the
diﬀerences seen in the mid-cingulate cortex and cuneus were due to less deactivation for
gradual-repeat compared to gradual-naïve.
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picture immediately preceding the switch. At the actual time point
when participants indicated a change in their conscious percept (T0)
higher activations were found in the gradual-naïve condition compared
to the gradual-repeat condition in mid-cingulate cortex, supplementary
motor cortex and the cuneus, as well as in the angular gyrus/TPJ on the
right. Higher activations for gradual-repeat compared to gradual-naïve
were only found in the angular gyrus on the left (Table 3; Fig. 5). At the
picture immediately following a switch (T1) higher activations for
gradual-naïve compared to gradual-repeat were found in the left middle
frontal gyrus (MNI − 36 8 28 – an area typically associated with se-
mantic processing; Lau et al., 2008 and Whitney et al., 2010 for re-
view). No area showed higher activation for the gradual-repeat com-
pared to the gradual-naïve condition.
3.4.2. Proactive vs. reactive switch: gradual-naïve vs. abrupt
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found at time point –T1 between
gradual-naïve and abrupt pictures, suggesting that similar processes
were active in both conditions before the shift. Higher activations
during a gradual-naïve compared to an abrupt change at T0 were ob-
served in the cingulate cortex, right frontal and occipital areas. Higher
activations for abrupt compared to gradual-naïve switches were found
the temporal cortex on the left (Table 3; Fig. 5, left panel) (Table 3;
Fig. 5, left panel). At the picture immediately after the switch (T1)
Fig. 2. (a) Average percentage of second object reports over the 15 pictures – displayed for the gradual conditions (naïve and repeat). (b) Average reaction times displayed for the switch
point (T0), together with the six picture before (− 6T to− T1) and after the switch (T1 to T6). Error bars in both graphs reﬂect SE of the Mean. Blue line = gradual-naïve sets, red line
= gradual-repeat sets, green line = abrupt sets. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Brain activity when perceptual reports changed (deﬁned as the picture when button
presses changed from 1 to 2 and the immediately preceding and succeeding periods), was
contrasted separately against activations for stable periods (the three pictures at the start
and end of each set). Only clusters are reported with a cluster size of ten or consecutive
voxels.
Neural correlates at the change period (− T1, T0) in the gradual condition
Area #voxels T x y z
− T1 > Stable
R Calcarin Cortex 33 7.51 24 − 61 4
L Calcarin Cortex 34 7.26 − 9 − 73 13
Mid Frontal/ACC 75 7.06 6 14 49
R Anterior Insula 61 6.74 36 23 − 5
L Anterior Insula 26 6.7 − 30 23 − 2
R Inferior frontal gyrus 32 6.55 48 11 22
T0 > Stable
Mid Frontal/ACC 212 9.22 3 11 52
L Anterior Insula 64 9.12 − 33 23 − 5
R Mid Frontal Gyrus 200 7.96 33 50 19
R frontal Operculum/
Insula
222 7.81 48 20 4
R angular gyrus 99 6.28 48 − 49 40
Brain stem/Thalamus 13 6.2 9 − 28 − 8
L Mid Frontal gyrus 13 5.9 − 30 50 19
L Supramarginal gyrus 10 5.64 − 48 − 40 46
Fig. 3. Whole-brain, random-eﬀects group analyses for the gradual-naïve condition conducted with contrast t maps thresholded at an FWE = .05. Stable pictures (the ﬁrst and last three
pictures of each series) were contrasted with the picture before (− T1), at (T0) and after (T1) the change. Only clusters are reported with a cluster size of ten or more consecutive voxels.
Fig. 4. Conjunction analysis for gradual-naïve, gradual-repeat and abrupt at T0.
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higher activations were found in the mid-cingulate gyrus (− 15−19
40) for gradual-naïve compared to abrupt pictures. Areas in the middle
temporal gyrus (MNI − 63 − 16 −8) and superior frontal gyrus (MNI
− 21 23 55) showed higher activations for abrupt compared to gradual-
naïve pictures at time point T1.
4. Discussion
The goal of the present study was to shed light on the neural cor-
relates engaged in updating in response to slow and subtle changes in
the environment. In our previous study participants had to proactively
decide in a gradually morphing picture task at which point their initial
representation was no longer supported by the evidence. While our
study provided interesting results it did not allow us to determine,
whether these activations are speciﬁc to updating in a slowly changing
environment. They also did not allow us to diﬀerentiate between dif-
ferent processes of perceptual uncertainty vs. proactive decision
making. Participants in this study were again exposed to gradually
morphing picture series. By presenting all picture morphs twice we
manipulated uncertainty in perceptual decision making. Inducing an
abrupt shift in a third condition allowed us to diﬀerentiate between a
proactive decision in uncertainty driven updating (i.e., when an initial
representation is now faced with conﬂicting evidence) and a reactive
decision in surprise-based updating (i.e., based on the observation of
unexpected external events).
Despite using fewer pictures sets (i.e., 10 instead of 20) and dif-
ferent analysis software (Brain Voyager in our earlier study and SPM12
here) we were able to replicate our earlier results. Again we found that
the anterior insula and mid frontal/ACC region was active before par-
ticipants reported a change. This demonstrates the robustness of our
results – a non-trivial point given the ongoing discussion about failures
to replicate in psychological science in general (Bohannon, 2015 for a
review) and fMRI research in particular (Carp, 2012a, 2012b; Eklund
et al., 2016).
We also tested which brain areas were active during a shift in per-
cept regardless of the type of shift or the amount of perceptual
Table 2
Regions showing signiﬁcant eﬀects at T0 in all three conditions.
Conjunction at time T0 in gradual-naïve, gradual-repeat and abrupt
Regions #voxels T x y z
L anterior Insula 74 6.88 − 33 20 − 8
R anterior insula 120 6.49 42 23 − 8
R intraparietal 306 5.63 36 − 58 58
R Inferior frontal 245 5.42 48 14 34
Mid frontal area 144 5.38 3 26 43
L Intraparietal 96 5.3 − 45 − 43 46
R Inferior frontal 41 4.62 48 41 − 11
L Inferior frontal 39 4.21 − 36 8 25
Table 3
Selective activations in the gradual-naïve, gradual-repeat and abrupt condition at T0.
Selective activations at T0
Regions: gradual-naïve > abrupt # voxels T x y z
ACC 55 5.89 12 26 25
Supplementary motor/middle cingulate 63 5.82 6 11 52
L calcarin cortex 283 5.41 − 9 − 79 7
L middle cingulate cortex 55 5.19 − 15 − 22 34
R middle frontal gyrus 50 4.83 33 50 22
R inferior frontal gyrus/frontal
operculum
41 4.73 51 11 4
Regions: abrupt> gradual-naïve
L temporal pole 47 4.65 − 39 5 − 17
L middle temporal gyrus 40 4.56 − 45 − 58 4
Regions: gradual-naïve> gradual-repeat
Middle cingulate cortex 147 5.25 − 6 − 16 40
Supplementary motor cortex 74 4.88 15 − 10 55
Cuneus 77 4.65 3 − 79 34
R angular gyrus/TPJ 65 4.57 48 − 55 22
Regions: gradual-repeat> gradual-naïve
L Angular gyrus 103 5.46 − 42 − 58 46
Fig. 5. Selective eﬀects for gradual-naïve, gradual-repeat and abrupt condition at T0.
E. Stöttinger et al. Neuropsychologia 112 (2018) 86–94
91
uncertainty. At the moment of shift (T0), a distributed network – in-
cluding the anterior insula (bilaterally) and the mid frontal area/ACC –
was active in all conditions. This is in line with research on surprise-
based updating that has typically assigned a central role to the anterior
insula and ACC for updating in response to events saliently deviating
from expectations (Craig, 2009; Menon and Uddin, 2010; Uddin, 2015
for a review). In a similar vein, McGuire et al. (2014) directly compared
uncertainty-based and surprised based updating. They too reported
joint activations in the anterior insula (bilateral), dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex, and right inferior frontal junction in uncertainty and
surprised based updating. Interestingly, diﬀerent areas were jointly
active at diﬀerent time points. The right inferior frontal gyrus was ac-
tive in all three conditions at the picture immediately preceding the
change. This ﬁts with studies on bistable perception suggesting a causal
role of the right inferior frontal gyrus (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007;
Weilnhammer et al., 2013, 2017) in perceptual alternations via med-
iation of activity in the visual cortex. To examine which brain networks
are associated with the newly formed representation we also analyzed
brain activations after the switch (T1). After participants changed their
conscious percept, joint activation for all conditions was found in the
right angular gyrus/superior parietal lobe. This is in line with research
showing an involvement of the right angular gyrus/superior parietal
lobe in inhibition of a former correct response (Seghier, 2013; Wager
et al., 2005 for a review) and the maintaining of internal representa-
tions (Wolpert et al., 1998). Finally, we diﬀerentiated which brain areas
are associated with perceptual uncertainty from those involved in up-
dating due to proactive decisions. To examine the eﬀect of uncertainty
in perceptual decision making, we compared the change period for
gradual-naïve picture sets with the change period for gradual-repeat
picture sets. Based on the assumption that longer reaction times in-
dicate a more diﬃcult perceptual decision (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt,
2010), we found that a decision in the gradual-naïve condition was
perceptually more diﬃcult than a decision in the gradual repeat con-
dition. Diﬀerences in activations for gradual-naïve compared to gradual-
repeat shifts at T0 were found in the mid-cingulate cortex, supplemen-
tary motor area, cuneus, as well as in the angular gyrus/TPJ on the
right. This is in line with research associating the mid-cingulate cortex
and cuneus with task diﬃculty (Singh and Fawcett, 2008; Bush, 2009
for a review). Interestingly, no diﬀerence was found at the picture
immediately preceding a shift, although reaction times before the shift
were reliably higher in the gradual-naïve condition compared to the
gradual repeat condition. This suggests that the activations found at the
moment of shift, may not only reﬂect perceptual uncertainty but ad-
ditional processes. The right TPJ, for example, has been reported to be
involved in contextual updating of internal models (Geng and Vossel,
2013), in redirecting attention (Mitchell, 2007 for a review), and the
ability to take someone else's perspective (Saxe and Wexler, 2005;
Schurz et al., 2014 for a review). This activation therefore could also
reﬂect a need to test subsequent evidence and revise the perceptual
interpretation (see Filipowicz et al., 2016 for a review).
Higher activations for gradual repeat compared to gradual-naïve were
found in the left angular gyrus. This was seen not only at T0 but also at
the picture preceding the switch (− T1). At ﬁrst glance this contradicts
ﬁndings in the literature: repeated presentation of stimuli typically
results in reduced activation for repeat compared to initial exposure in
brain areas involved in processing these stimuli – a phenomenon known
as repetition suppression (for review Henson, 2003). However, ﬁndings
on repetition eﬀects are heterogeneous and repetition can result in
suppression or enhancement depending on factors particular to the
paradigm (e.g., timing, task demands, attention, expectation, etc.;
James and Gauthier, 2006; Segaert et al., 2013). In addition, it has been
argued that enhancement eﬀects in repetition priming might be due to
an additional process like explicit memory retrieval (see Segaert et al.,
2013 for this argument). This argument is plausible given that the an-
gular gyrus is also known to be involved in episodic memory retrieval
(Wagner et al., 2005 for review). In a similar vein, the left angular gyrus
has also been associated with visual perspective taking (Arora et al.,
2017; Schurz et al., 2013). Higher activation in the gradual-repeat
compared to the gradual-naïve condition might therefore reﬂect re-
peated alternation between two diﬀerent perspectives – similar to bis-
table perception. For our repeat conditions, uncertainty has been re-
moved – the participant knows the muscle man will turn into a coﬀee
pot. All that is left to do is actively switch back and forth between two
perspectives (e.g., muscle man vs. coﬀee pot) to decide when the visual
input supports one interpretation over another.
To evaluate which brain areas were more active during a proactive
compared to a reactive switch we compared the change points in the
gradual-naïve condition with the change points in the abrupt condition.
Higher activations for proactive compared to reactive shifts were found
in the mid frontal area, including the dorsal ACC, supplementary motor
area and mid-cingulate cortex, right interior frontal gyrus, as well as the
left calcarine cortex. The ACC – especially the dorsal part (dACC) – is
typically associated with the allocation of cognitive control, error de-
tection, outcome evaluation, conﬂict monitoring, and choice diﬃculty.
In a similar vein, the dACC is also reliably active in decision making
within a foraging task (i.e., striking the balance between exploration vs.
exploitation) and the alteration of behavior in response to changes in
the environment (Filipowicz et al., 2016; Shenhav et al., 2016 for a
review). It has been argued that activation in the dorsal ACC can be
more parsimoniously explained by exploration of alternative inter-
pretations when the current representations are no longer supported by
evidence from the environment (Domenech and Koechlin, 2015;
McGuire and Kable, 2015; Shenhav et al., 2014; Filipowicz et a, 2016
for a review). This notion is further supported by research in non-
human primates showing increased ﬁring rates in the dACC, when a
monkey chooses to move on to a new patch (i.e., at the transition be-
tween exploitation and exploration; Hayden et al., 2011). Higher acti-
vation in the dACC for gradual-naïve compared to abrupt shifts therefore
most likely reﬂects the need to actively explore potential alternatives in
the gradual-naïve condition. In the abrupt condition, the second object is
“presented on a silver platter”. Consequently, there is no need for ex-
ploration of alternative interpretations of what it might be.
Higher activations in the right inferior frontal gyrus for proactive
compared to reactive shifts resemble results in studies on bistable
perception. Studies comparing spontaneous (active) alternations with
stimulus-induced (passive) changes, typically ﬁnd stronger activations
in a fronto-parietal network including the inferior-frontal gyrus for
spontaneous compared to stimulus induced transitions (i.e., transition
are mimicked in a replay condition to create the impression of per-
ceptual alternations; Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer and Rees, 1999; Knapen
et al., 2011; Megumi et al., 2015; Müller et al., 2005; Weilnhammer
et al., 2013). Eﬀective connectivity analysis suggests a causal role of the
right inferior frontal gyrus (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007;
Weilnhammer et al., 2013) in perceptual transitions via mediation of
activity in the visual cortex. Therefore, activation in the inferior frontal
gyrus together with activation in the calcarine cortex probably reﬂects
the proactive decision to update to a new interpretation.
Higher activations for shifts in the abrupt condition compared shifts
in the gradual-naïve at T0 were found in the temporal pole and middle
temporal gyrus (posterior portion) on the left – areas typically involved
in semantic processing, including storage of lexical representations and
semantic violation (Lau et al., 2008; Whitney et al., 2010 for a review).
Higher activation for abrupt compared to gradual-naïve shifts may reﬂect
the need to activate a new interpretation for the unexpected, abrupt
change in perceptual input.
Some might argue that it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between purely
perceptual and response-related processes in our tasks. Since the switch
in the percept is signaled by a change in the motor response, perceptual
updating and motor (re)planning seem to be inherently linked.
Therefore, higher activation in frontal areas and the ACC may also re-
ﬂect eﬀects of motor inhibition and response conﬂict monitoring
(Braver et al., 2001; Van Veen et al., 2001). However, participants in all
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conditions have to indicate a change in percept by a change in motor
response (i.e., from pressing button one with the index ﬁnger to
pressing button two with the middle ﬁnger). Any activation explicitly
driven by motor planning per se would be expected to cancel out in all
our contrasts.
In a similar vein, it could be argued that regions associated with a
proactive decision in our study instead reﬂect a conﬂict between
choices at the time of updating similar to the response conﬂict in a
Stroop colour-word interference test. That is, while in the abrupt con-
dition the picture clearly depicts the second object, there is a conﬂict
between the two diﬀerent interpretations in the gradual conditions.
Although many of the regions we observe are also observed in response
conﬂict paradigms (e.g., ACC, right middle frontal gyrus; Alvarez and
Emory, 2006 for a review) we do not feel that updating in our task
reﬂects a classic response conﬂict. In the Stroop task both stimulus
properties are instantaneously present while in the gradual-naïve con-
dition the second object is unknown to the participant. It is unlikely
that an unknown (or at least uncertain) stimulus property can conﬂict
with a known property. Also, participants are “primed” for a change.
They know that change will occur and that they need to determine
when the ﬁrst object has become something else. This would seem to
further obviate any sense of conﬂict.
Summary: Our main aim was to shed light on the neural correlates
active in response to gradually changing environments. How do we
decide at which point our steak is grilled to perfection? Which brain
areas are engaged when we make decisions based on the accumulation
of subtle, incremental changes in the environment? Are these activa-
tions diﬀerent when the decision is taken out of our hands and made for
us? Previously, we demonstrated that a network of brain regions in-
cluding the anterior insula and mid-frontal cortex is active at the mo-
ment we update our conscious reports and immediately prior to making
that decision (Stöttinger et al., 2015). By replicating the results here, we
demonstrated the robustness of this eﬀect. Furthermore, we found that
this network of brain areas was active in all three conditions at the
moment of the perceptual shift, suggestive of a generic role in updating,
irrespective of perceptual uncertainty and the type of decision to be
made (proactive vs. reactive). When perceptual uncertainty was a factor
(i.e., contrasting gradual-naïve with gradual-repeat shifts), the brain
areas active mirror those found in manipulations of task diﬃculty, with
additional regions reﬂecting the shift to a new perspective. Directly
contrasting proactive and reactive decisions highlighted regions known
to be important for exploration of novel hypotheses and the endogenous
decision to switch to new interpretations/representations. Taken to-
gether, these results are reﬂective of the interplay between a generic
updating network and brain regions more speciﬁcally involved in dis-
tinct types of decision making.
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